S
weden's position as a great European power reached its zenith in the period between the 1640s and the 1660s. However, it is in exactly this period that researchers have discovered the existence of state officials who were indispensable for the proper functioning of the realm but whose competence would seem to have left a lot to be desired: "A weak and insignificant person -a servant of Axel Oxenstierna even after his appointment as mayor" (Västerås, 1640s-1650s); 1 "Despotic and lacking self-control" (Gävle, 1640s); 2 and "The new mayor was an officious and pedantic braggart, who angered the people of Oulu by his autocratic behaviour and his pursuit of his own gain that led to dishonest deeds" (Oulu, 1640s-1660s) . 3 Harsh judgments of this kind have made by historians above all about the so-called "royal mayors". But can these judgments be generalized? Do they hold true at all beyond the individual level?
This chapter examines the activities of the royal mayors who were appointed in the period 1620-1720 in the "old towns" of the Kingdom of Sweden. 4 It proceeds from the premise that the personal agency of functionaries -which was constituted by the norms that directed their activities, the implementation of these norms, and the individual's actions -is often of crucial significance in assessing their activities as a whole within the existing relatively strictly state-regulated institutional structures. 5 The appointment of royal mayors in principle involved a significant infringement of the autonomy of the towns, to which the existing legislation accorded a considerable amount of freedom. In this connection, the historico-cultural and historico-political perspectives come to the fore since the interpretations of the activities of royal mayors have naturally been influenced at different times by the chronologically bound views and contexts both of their contemporaries and of later researchers.
The term "royal mayor" is here broadly defined to include both functionaries appointed by a secular authority (the ruler, a governor general (generalguvernör) or a county governor (landshövding /ståthållare) and officials who were assigned to their posts on the basis of a warrant issued by the holder of a grand fief (a count or a baron). On the other hand, mayors who had received the support of the townsfolk before their selection are not included.
The term "old towns" is here used to refer to towns that were founded before 1632, i.e. before the coming to power of the guardian regency in the early reign of Queen Christina. The justification for this chronological boundary is that in practice for all towns that were founded after 1632 mayors were appointed on the strong recommendation of the ruler or the holder of the fief.
7 By contrast, the appointments of mayors in the territories conquered by Sweden from Denmark in the 1640s and 1650s, that is modern southern Sweden, constituted part of an organized Swedification policy that was implemented in this area particularly at the stage when possession was being taken of the towns. The implementation of this policy was much harsher than the in itself effective policy of integration of the administration that was realised in Finland. The towns of the dominions have also been omitted from this examination. 8 No particular learning was required of royal mayors in the early seventeenth century, and the ruler often appointed men without any university education at all. The situation changed during the course of the century, which in itself suggests that the educational system was developed to produce enough "academics" to occupy posts in local government, when previously the qualified candidates had all been snatched for central and provincial government duties. 9 On the other hand, the ennoblement of mayors was rare, and when it did happen the mayor usually relinquished his urban administrative duties. 10 The royal mayors have been the object of study in Sweden and Finland ever since the second half of the nineteenth century. Historians have repeatedly addressed the subject, for example in numerous town histories and doctoral theses. In practice, all Swedish and Finnish town histories deal with the interconnections between the royal mayors and the burghers and on a general level with the work of the town courts, which functioned under the mayors.
11 For example, Gudrun Andersson has analysed the family connections of mayors in her research on elite groups in Arboga and noted the importance of arranged marriages in the integration of royal mayors into the urban community.
12 In addition, a certain amount has been written in biographical reference works like Svensk biografiskt lexikon (SBL), Kansallisbiografia (KB) and Biografiskt lexikon för Finland (BLF), but they contain no analyses of the actions of the mayors or the effects of these.
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The basic material for this chapter on the appointment of royal mayors has been gathered from the indices of the Institute of Urban History (Stadshistoriska institutet) (SIR), which is located in the National Archives (Riksarkivet, SRA) in Stockholm, and it is supplemented with data from the Swedish National Records (Riksregistratur) and previous research. This combination of different sources has made it possible to conduct a more profound enquiry into the personal agency of royal mayors.
The justification and legitimation of mayoral appointments
In the Early Modern Age, the grip of the state on the towns tightened almost everywhere in Europe.
14 The state authorities in Sweden, particularly in the early years of the seventeenth century, considered that it was indispensable to improve the efficiency of the administration because the state needed ever more financial resources during the on-going protracted period of warfare, and the levying of taxes entailed a viable organization. Thus taxes, particularly in the form of ready cash, were sorely needed to pay for the expenses of war, and it was thought that only the towns would be able to provide these to a sufficient extent. Therefore, the economic level of the towns and their tax-paying capability had to be enhanced. The central administration regarded the towns' own ability and willingness to develop measures of this kind with scepticism, and therefore it sought to take even small towns under its supervision. In 1619, on the basis of experience obtained in Stockholm, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna (1583-1654) drew up a directive for the towns (1619 års stadga om städernas administration), most of the regulations of which concentrated on enhancing their economic life. Among other things, the directive proposed to increase the number of functionaries, tighten up scrutiny and make the towns' judicial institution into a two-tier establishment, measures that all aimed at making local administration more efficient. Thus, in the course of time, lower instances which passed quick judgments in minor cases were established to operate under the town courts in many towns. The towns tried to implement the directive of 1619, although the regulations often proved difficult to obey immediately. 15 Consequently, the required changes were not put into effect, or matters proceeded too slowly from the point of view of the state authorities, and it became necessary for them to move on from the mere expression of normative wishes to ensuring their practical realisation -from ideas to actions. Finally, therefore, in the 1630s, the central government adopted a new approach, first of all in those towns that it deemed to be important. Men furnished with a royal letter of appointment, royal mayors, were sent to them to act as watchdogs and taskmasters. In the major towns on the Finnish side of the realm, Turku (Åbo) and Vyborg (Viborg), the governors general had already successfully dealt with the recruitment of officers for town courts. Now the same methods began to be applied in Sweden proper, and the influence of the state was extended even to towns that were of minor significance. 16 However, the government had to be able to justify the appointments of royal mayors to the burghers, who constituted an estate that, while admittedly disunited and politically not so significant, was nevertheless glamorous and economically crucial. 17 How could the government legitimate its actions in planting its own favourites to govern the towns?
With the advent of the royal mayors to control of the towns, which had hitherto possessed a strong degree of formal autonomy, the power over urban administration passed in practice to the Crown, although it is true that even before that the ruler had had some say in the government of the towns: it was a particular feature of Swedish towns that they were politically and also juridically subject to the king. 18 Thus there was not a single city that had simply come into being; all of them had been founded.
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David Beetham defines legitimacy as being "legality, normative justifiability, express consent". In Sweden, the strong role of the state vis-à-vis the towns maintained its legitimacy even in those times when there were offences against the autonomy of the latter, although the quotations cited at the beginning of this chapter might indicate the contrary.
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The state obtained strong backing from the regulations of the Instrument of Government of 1634 (regeringsform) and the regulations issued to county governors the following year, on the basis of which the latter replaced governors equipped with vague instructions at the head of the reformed county government. The county governor did not personally participate in the administration of law in the towns of the area under his jurisdiction since the supervision of the lower courts had been transferred in toto to the courts of appeal. On the other hand, the remit of the head of the county had expanded to such an extent that he could no longer be expected to engage in the previous kind of personal supervision of affairs at the local level. Despite this, the central government naturally considered it important that it should have its "own" representatives in the towns. However, the Burghers had been secured the right in the mediaeval Town Law of King Magnus Eriksson (stadslag) to freely elect their own administrative officers, and consequently the government could not in principle interfere in the appointment of mayors, for instance, and thereby influence the administration and dispensation of justice.
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In order to preserve the legitimacy of its actions and to maintain a dialogue with the towns, the state temporarily adopted office titles that were unknown in the Town Law: it could if it so desired instate in the towns officials like a "burgrave" (borggreve) or a "president" totally without seeking the consent of the townsfolk at all. The new officials ranked above the mayors and the aldermen in the hierarchy of the town's administration. 22 It was above all a temporary measure since the primus motor of the policy for the towns, Axel Oxenstierna, stated in the early 1640s that in the future it would be necessary to strengthen the authority of the mayors. The state had to seek cooperation with the burghers, and in this respect the relationship between the state and the towns was reciprocal, although it was the central government that held the upper hand in this asymmetrical relationship. At the same time, the state authorities sought to ensure that the officials sent to the towns would be at least formally competent to perform their duties in their communities -their execution of these duties affected the success of the measure more than institutional limitations. 23 The state's discreet way of winning over the townsfolk to accept their proposals took the form of concessions to the towns which were typically connected with various excise dues and import duties paid to the town (tolag) as well as other taxes that were paid in money. When the Crown offered to pay back some of the dues it had levied to pay for the salaries of the mayor and the aldermen, it at the same time bound the urban government to ensure the efficiency and profitability of its administration. This in turn promoted the growth of the Crown's tax revenues, too. The appointment of mayors was in this respect a most opportune bargaining point, as the case of Hans Prytz ((lifetime unknown), who was appointed Mayor of Nyköping, illustrates. In its letter to the county governor, the central government gave him to understand that the appointment was a sensitive matter on account of the regulations of the Town Law. Therefore it was hoped that he would present the matter discretely to the town administrative board and to the burghers. In the end, the issue did not raise any problems, a result that was naturally helped by the fact that it was linked to tax concessions. 24 In the 1630s and particularly the 1640s, the towns applied to the monarch in person for funds to pay the salaries of their officials. 25 They thus nursed the hope that the state would pay for the salaries of local officials generally and in particular for the maintenance of mayors, but in practice just about all the towns were soon disappointed in this hope. Halfway through the century, the government generally required the towns themselves to pay the salaries of their officials. 26 The salary issue was naturally a potential cause of dispute, but the adequate and regular reimbursement of officials was important since among other things it would genuinely help to prevent corruption (the definition of which is admittedly difficult in the context of the seventeenth century) and other supererogatory activities that were detrimental to the organization of the town court. 27 In any case, in the seventeenth century one finds only a couple of mayoral appointments in connection with which the central authorities enforced their will without hearing the burghers' views at all. Generally, a solution was sought through milder means and by making the town an offer that it could not refuse, although the wording of the monarch's letters in itself was stern: it was nearly always stated that the finances of the city in questions had been poorly handled and the privileges graciously awarded to it by His/ Her Majesty neglected. Generally the same phrases were repeated from one letter to the next. That, however, was not the case in Arboga in 1642, to which exceptionally the guardian regency acting for Queen Christina simply appointed two royal mayors simultaneously. 28 The reason for the state's exceptional severity was probably the fact that the town had for years suffered a state of extreme crisis, which was particularly reflected in the weak authority of its administrative and judicial organs. 29 Thus the forceful implementation of the state's decisions was rare, and even when this did happen, there was no guarantee of its being successful. In Jönköping, in the late 1650s, the county governor tried to forcefully install one Johan Persson, a lawyer of the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt), as mayor. However, the town administrative board and the burghers unanimously opposed the appointment and demanded that their right of election be adhered to, stating that they would rather give up their status as burghers than accept this person as their mayor. In the end, the county governor withdrew his candidate -the matter had clearly not been prepared and carried out on the level to which the burghers were accustomed.
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Appointments of royal mayors
The state authorities had intervened at an early stage in the appointments of mayors, especially in the largest and most important towns. Certainly from the time of Gustavus Vasa (1496-1560) on, persons who had been approved by the monarch were appointed as mayors of Stockholm, although usually the first royal mayor is considered to have been Olaus Bureus, who was appointed to the post in 1621 and was often referred to as "the Royal Mayor of Stockholm". 31 Moreover, even before the official regulations were issued in the seventeenth century, the governors, the predecessors of the county governors, had addressed defects that they observed in the administration of the towns since at least the most important (frontier) towns had to be properly administered if for no other reason then for the external security of the realm. 32 The monarch issued reminders to the prefects concerning towns where the governor or county governor maintained his residence that they should keep a close eye on events and the legality of activities in the town courts.
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In Finland, the appointment of royal mayors from the 1620s to the 1650s was largely the responsibility of the governors general, who enjoyed wide powers. Thereafter, from the mid-century on, the holders of grand fiefs sometimes made appointments in the towns located in areas under their jurisdiction. In a class all of his own was Count Per Brahe (1602-1680), who was twice Governor General of Finland (generalguvernör) and at the same time Lord High Chancellor (drots) and a nobleman who held grand fiefs both in Sweden and in Finland. He had a considerable influence on official appointments in the Finnish half of the realm right up to the end of the 1670s. Just as in Sweden, persons without offices or posts did not just wait passively at home to be summoned; rather they were active in contacting their patrons, whose recommendation carried great weight in the filling of posts. 34 Similarly, royal letters of appointment were sought in the hope that they would lead to even better positions: for example, the persons chosen as Mayors of Arboga in the years 1644 and 1654 did not take up their posts: one of them opted to go rather to Stockholm and the other to Västerås.
35
By the mid-century, the majority of the old towns in Sweden (N = 32) and Finland (N= 12) had received at least one royal mayor. The last of the towns in the eastern half of the realm to which a royal mayor was appointed was Borgå (Porvoo) in 1658. On the other hand, on the Swedish side, no royal mayor was appointed in every fourth town, but all of these were provincial towns that were deemed to be of little importance.
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The first times when appointments were made naturally do not as such reveal everything about the total number of persons who served as mayors or about the quality of their work in particular. Altogether 162 mayors held office in the old towns of the Finnish side of the realm in the period 1620-1720. About half of them (N = 79) were royal mayors, half of whom served until they died, while 15 of them (about 20% of all royal mayors) were dismissed from their posts. On the Swedish side of the kingdom, corresponding information has been systematically gathered for three different towns: the ecclesiastical and university town of Uppsala, the industrial town and staple port of Norrköping and the mediumsized provincial town of Linköping.
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On the basis of this information, observations made from research literature and estimates, in all about 800 mayors served in the old towns in the whole realm of Sweden in the period 1620-1720. About 350 of them had royal letters of appointment. In Sweden proper, the dismissal of royal mayors was considerably rarer in relation to the number of towns than it was in Finland. Assessed on this basis, in the whole kingdom about every tenth royal mayor was forced to quit his post against his will. This number may be considered a low one.
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The operations of the royal mayors and their conflicts with the burghers
When there was a conflict between the townsfolk and the mayor, it was usually connected with various reforms and the increased surveillance of the inhabitants. C. T. Odhner, who studied this subject back in the 1860s, noted that in many towns the burghers were disappointed in their royal superiors because of the strict demands made on them by the latter. 39 Often it was a question of a clash of different administrative cultures: it was the task of the royal mayors to act specifically as instigators of change, an endeavour in which conflicts were difficult to avoid.
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A solution to the in part only apparent contradiction between the conceptions that have previously been presented and the findings of the present chapter is sought by examining the achievements of the royal mayors. After all, the central authorities did not establish their own candidates in posts just for them to twiddle their thumbs.
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In 1641, Jacob Lithman (1611-1674), the son of the Rector of Örebro, was appointed to be the mayor of his home town at the age of 30. His letter of appointment became a veritable model since its contents were repeated word for word in the warrants of at least 25 town mayors over the next 15 years. According to this document, the county governor and the royal bailiff should have participated in the administration of the town, but their other duties prevented them from attending the meetings of the town court. Lithman was thus appointed to be the representative of the king, for which task he was furnished with a set of 13 instructions. The special duties of the mayor were connected with the surveillance and development of justice and administration in accordance with the state's longer-term plans and the supervision of the town's privileges, industries and economy generally. A new addition to the instructions was the supervision of the condition and use of the town's public infrastructure. The list of tasks is focal in judging the personal agency of the mayors. It would appear that other mayors received similar instructions since they, too, most commonly focussed their attention on matters like those mentioned above.
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Often the most important task of the royal mayors was connected with supervising the systems of justice and administration and improving their efficiency. Typically, various administrative and juridical reforms were implemented soon after the arrival of a new mayor. In Örebro, the energetic Jacob Lithman followed his instructions and among other things drew up a special set of judicial directions, strictly defined the time and place where business might be conducted, promoted and supervised the activities of artisans and set limits on the lavishness of entertainments at weddings and other parties. These measures were not greeted with joyful acclaim by the burghers or in the town administrative court, but the monarch recognized Lithman's abilities and soon made him Assessor of the Göta Court of Appeal. He later served as an under-and vice-lawspeaker (lagman -a district chief judge) in the countryside and he was ennobled for his achievements in 1654. 43 The presidents, who served as "models" for the royal mayors, were also without exception resolute in developing the towns' systems of administration and justice. 44 Many of the mayors who received royal letters of appointment from the monarch followed suit, and typical among the new ideas they implemented were the division of the town court into departments (collegium) and the reorganization of the justice system in the form of the establishment of lower town courts (kämnerrätt) to operate under the town courts (rådshusrätt). 45 Almost without exception, the quality of the material describing the activities of the town's organ of administration and justice improved after the appointment of a royal mayor. However, it is not possible to make a direct connection between the arrival of a mayor and the dense recording of the minutes of meetings of the town court. 46 From the 1630s on, considerable attention was paid in Sweden to the drafting of new town plans. 47 The dismantling of the complicated, fire-prone networks of streets, which failed to match the Central European ideal of urban planning, became the main task of many royal mayors. This was the case with Daniel Kempe (1604-1654), a junior lawyer at the Svea court of appeal (Svea hovrätt) who was appointed as Royal Mayor of Västerås. It is an indication of Kempe's reputation that the history of the town has been periodized according to his time in office (1641-1654). 48 The routine official tasks of the royal mayors have not generally been brought out in assessing their work; rather, various "violent disagreements" 49 or other types of conflict situations in which the relations between them and the other members of the town administrative board and/or the burghers became inflamed have been sought. When a mayor was accused of abusing his position or of malfeasance, the Crown usually appointed a commission made up of disinterested parties (commissorial rätt) or some other neutral organ to investigate the claims. Such temporary investigatory and judicial organs were needed in the towns strikingly often in the 1650s and 1660s, after which they became rare. 50 The arguments almost always concerned money in one way or another. The reimbursement of the royal mayors was a constant source of dispute, especially when the burghers found that they would be totally or partly responsible for it. It rarely occurred to them that by paying for the salary of the official they might thereby engage his extended loyalty to the community -on the contrary, they usually suspected that the mayor was serving the interests of the state authorities. 51 However, most commonly the problem was that the salary was felt to be too high, and in some smaller towns the mayors sometimes agreed to accept lower emoluments.
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The monarch certainly became interested in the internal affairs of the town if there were complaints about financial wrongdoings. For example, the ruthless implementation of regularization in Västerås gave rise to extensive investigations, as a result of which both the town's "own" mayor and the royal mayor were sentenced to pay reparations amounting to thousands of silver thalers. 53 In Jönköping, problems arose between the royal mayor, Johan Håkansson Reese (also known as Johannes Haquini Rhezelius, d.1666), and the burghers over the renting of the "town cellar" (a restaurant reserved for the burghers). The mayor was dismissed for malfeasance during the years 1661-1664, but he was restored to his post by the monarch at the beginning of 1665.
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In Uppsala in the early 1660s, the mayor Jacob Abrahamsson Ruuth (d.1666) was accused of malpractice in the administration of justice and of the illegal usufruct together with other mayors of lands awarded by the Crown to the town. Ruuth was found guilty of grievous malfeasance and neglect of his duties, as a result of which he and several other important members of the town court were suspended from their posts. Eventually Ruuth was dismissed altogether, but in his decision His Royal Majesty stressed the fact that that he had not been stripped of his honour and thereby of opportunities to serve in Crown offices elsewhere than Uppsala.
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In a class of their own are cases where the mayor completely lost his self-control and through his colourful language and other inappropriate behaviour caused trouble for himself. There are glaring examples in many towns of mayors abusing and showing downright contempt for their subordinates and the burghers of the towns under their jurisdiction. Many of the royal mayors who got into the worst difficulties were lawyers by training, but even so -or perhaps for that very reason -they used coarse language in the letters and various reports that they sent to the courts of appeal and even to the monarch. Such documents naturally constitute central evidence about the behaviour of an official and they illustrate various conflict situations, but one must take a cautious attitude to their use for directly assessing a person's work in the past.
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Although some of the problems affecting the royal mayors' execution of their duties have been focused on above, in fact the burghers usually accepted the central authority's choice of candidate and in some cases were even satisfied with the work of their mayors. The burghers would seem above all to have expected the mayor to act in accordance with the requirements of his post; in other words, to be the leader of the town and to bear responsibility for the duties attached to his official position. This was noticed in the 1650s by Casper Eichman (c. 1590-1670), the Mayor of Nystad (Uusikaupunki), who liked to appear as the "boss" (förman) of the town and, in accordance with the patriarchal ideal of the age, as the "father" of the townsfolk. He blustered repeatedly about his own authority and honour and was constantly badgering the burghers to give their opinions about the general efficiency of the town's administration and his own work. And time and again the assessment was excellent. In return, the burghers required the "boss" to shoulder his responsibilities, and thus in 1655 they unanimously demanded that he, with all his experience of attending meetings of the estates, should represent the town's interests at the Diet (Riksdag) in Stockholm. Exceptionally, Eichman was not willing to travel: on the agenda there were expected to be certain difficult issues connected with disputes over financial interests, in which Nystad would be opposed by the earldom of Wasaborg, which had originally been granted to Gustaf Gustafsson af Wasaborg (1616-1653), the illegitimate son of King Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632). Casper Eichman appealed many times to the fact that his situation was an awkward one: he had received his letter of appointment as mayor from the now deceased holder of the earldom but he was the leaseholder of the customs house of Nystad and also the representative of the town. The strict requirement of the townspeople finally silenced Eichman, although "weeping, he begged their pardon and hoped that someone else might take the task upon himself " and, because he feared the reaction of the holder of the fief, was "between two fires". However, the burghers cried out as one man that because he was the leader of the town and the mayor, they could not entrust this matter to anyone else. The mayor's representation of the town at the Diet did, in fact, cause a rift in relations between him and the holder of the earldom, which drove Eichman, who was already in financial straits, to the brink of ruination. His execution of his duties was also encumbered. He was dismissed from his post for the first time in 1663, but he returned briefly to his duties, only to be sacked finally at the end of the decade. 57 Similarly, Daniel Kröger (d. 1672), who pursued a long albeit disrupted career (1647-1662) in Oulu (Uleåborg), was the object of the aggression of many of the town's burghers. Kröger, the son of the Mayor of Gävle, had studied at university and was a client of Lord High Steward Per Brahe. He was dismissed from his post several times as a result of complaints and the ensuing enquiries, but he was repeatedly reinstated by the Turku Court of Appeal (Åbo hovrätt). Kroger's position was certainly not helped by the fact that in the opinion of the townsfolk he had neglected his duties particularly during Charles X Gustav's Russian War (1656-1658). It was rumoured in the town that the mayor had fled to Stockholm out of fear of a Russian attack. Earlier in the same decade, the mayor and the aldermen under him were accused of planning "to get rich with our [the burghers'] money", since Kröger and his accomplices had obtained a monopoly of beer brewing. The mayor was finally sacked in 1662, but like the above mentioned Mayor of Uppsala, Jacob Ruuth, he was allowed to keep his honour and thereby his legal capacity.
58
Leaders in the cross-fire of different demands in changing times
In the early seventeenth century, Sweden, a mainly agricultural country that was rapidly becoming a great power in Europe, needed towns that could quickly supply the resources required for the protracted wars. Dozens of towns were founded in the course of the century, and experienced men were engaged to be the leaders (mayors) of many of these new urban communities. At the same time, it was also necessary to develop the old towns of Sweden, some of which had been founded 300-400 years earlier. However, it was fairly quickly realised that the autonomy of the towns and the initiative of the burghers alone were not sufficient to ensure that the royal directives were transformed into practical actions. One important solution to the problem took the form installing mayors furnished with royal letters of appointment who were expected to speed up the development and reorganization of the towns.
The appointment of royal mayors was common in the seventeenth century, and there were hundreds of them. As has become apparent above, their appointment usually involved some sort of trade-off between the ruler, or an organ representing him or her, and the town community. Previous research has often emphasized the steamrolling actions of the state authorities in connection with the appointments. However, the example of Arboga briefly described above was exceptional, although admittedly the measures taken by the state especially in the Swedification process of the former Danish territories in what is today southern Sweden were considerably harsher than elsewhere. Even so, if it had so wished, the central government could have imposed its will on the towns since it was the ruler who ultimately decided on their privileges and other benefits and on the salaries of the aldermen.
The autonomy of the towns and its loss as a result of the state's interference in official appointments has been highlighted as a central theme especially in the histories of the towns. However, the intervention in the burghers' right to elect local government officers was partly self-inflicted, for the towns themselves had proposed that the Crown should participate in paying the salaries of functionaries, and it was probably clear to the people of the time that, in a period of continual wars, the Crown would not provide any funding out of the mere kindness of its heart. Indeed, it was precisely because of the straitened situation that the hope of "sharing" the costs of administration had arisen in the towns because the demands of the state authorities on them generally, and particularly the taxes that were levied on them, were simultaneously growing. On the other hand, the person furnished with a royal letter of appointment who appeared in the town court with the task of ensuring the viable and efficient conduct of affairs was usually someone who was already familiar to the townsfolk, for it was very rare for a complete stranger to be assigned to the post. In Finland the most vociferous disputes between the mayors and their local communities arose when the newcomer was a person who was unfamiliar with local ways and strove to change them radically, although admittedly it was precisely leaders who could bring about change that the central authorities wanted.
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The personal agency of the royal mayors has often been seen as being characterized by conflicts between them and the townsfolk. Most typically, the unfolding of the drama has been constructed as a struggle of the town's "own" officials and burghers struggled against a mayor who was "a newcomer, an outsider who offended the administrative autonomy of the town". And it is true that the judgment rolls and the minutes of various temporary investigatory bodies do describe conflicts of this kind. For the most part, the disputes resulted from the fact that the mayors were implementing directions issued by the central authority and national regulations. Even so, they were not mere lapdogs of the Crown, and they usually prosecuted the interests of their towns efficiently. Moreover, because of their backgrounds, they were normally extremely well suited to handle the interaction between the central authorities and the local communities. The royal mayors often served as representatives at the Diet, and rarely did the burghers complain that their interests had been poorly or deficiently prosecuted.
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As a group, the royal mayors handled their thankless duties very well. Especially in small and economically weak towns, the burghers complained about the high salary expenses. Unlike their predecessors, the new mayors rarely engaged in commerce, and they lived off their salaries. In the late seventeenth century, most of the royal mayors had a university education, which on the one hand meant that they had much more theoretical expertise than many of their predecessors and on the other that the persons who were most important for the business life of the towns, the merchants, could concentrate more fully on the activities that were ordained in the fundamental principles of the society of the estates, in other words their business activities carried on within the framework of their estate privileges. In this way, through the royal mayors, the formal level of the judiciary was raised and the division of duties that was crucial for promoting the efficient running of society was increased.
The research on which this publication is based was funded by the Academy of Finland (grant no. 137741). Hakanen in the present work. 6 Usually the tasks of the royal mayors included several kinds of missions: in general, he acted as the leader of the town, as a chair of the town court (rådstugurätten) and executed all the instructions given by the central government and county administration (including also orders by the military officials). Thus, royal mayor was in charge concerning the town community as a whole. 
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